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Undertakers play a necessary if somewhat
unpopular role in modern life. And this is how
we see Tonneau’s article — as the undertaker who
is kindly helping bury our close friend, stimulus
equivalence. We suspect that few will thank Ton-
neau for providing this unpleasant service, but it
needs to be done.
Funerals are not pleasant occasions, but they
can serve an important social and psychological
function in preparing those left behind to move
on. In this case, moving on will be neither simple
nor easy. Like a widowed spouse considering
the future, equivalence researchers may be fright-
ened by what seems to lie ahead. For some,
stimulus equivalence was the behavior-analytic
answer to the cognitive challenge. Tonneau has
helped show how thin that claim has become.
The demise of equivalence may appear to
threaten the future of behavior analysis – at least
for those who feel (correctly) that providing an
adequate account of language and cognition is
essential. Hopefully, however, this very threat will
galvanize the field into action. Human language
and cognition stand before behavior analysis like
a vast mountain range. Basic behavioral research-
ers must not turn back from this challenge if
their science is to survive.
In this commentary on Tonneau’s article we
will echo some of his concerns pertaining to the
study of stimulus equivalence. However, we will
also explain why we believe that his focus on
what he calls functional equivalence and stimulus
correlations is problematic. Finally, we will argue
that a modern behavioral approach is needed to
scale the mountains of human language and cog-
nition, and this approach is fundamentally oper-
ant in nature. We will offer Relational Frame
Theory as a map for the course ahead (see Hayes,
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).
Stimulus Equivalence as an Exhausted
Research Paradigm
Tonneau questions the relevance of  the data
gathered by equivalence-class researchers to their
stated purpose – the understanding of symbolic
behavior. In large part we agree. Stimulus equiva-
lence is simply too narrow and too limited to
carry the weight some have put on it. It is a re-
search preparation that shows every sign of ex-
haustion. The warning signs are myriad, but two
stand out.
Limited Applied Impact
Behavior analysis is a field that develops be-
havioral principles in order to understand human
complexity (Skinner, 1938, p. 441), not as an end
in itself. After 30 years of research, stimulus
equivalence has produced little impact on applied
behavior analysis. Only very rarely, for example,
do the pages of  the Journal of  Applied Behavior
Analysis contain an article bearing on the applica-
tion of stimulus equivalence. If stimulus equiva-
lence is an adequate account of human symbolic
behavior, surely much more should be expected.




Basic behavior analysis, and the field as a whole,
needs a theory that will lead to an experimental
analysis of human language and cognition. If such
a theory were available, we would expect it to
inspire basic research on intelligence, problem
solving, emotion, reasoning, language develop-
ment, and a whole host of  similar areas. Stimulus
equivalence has failed to do so. Instead of  broad-
ening over time, the focus of equivalence research
seems to be narrowing to increasingly arcane is-
sues, disconnected from human language and
cognition as a general phenomenon. What was
once an outcome that might orient the field to key
process issues in the analysis of language, is now
being studied as an end in itself.
Considered as an end in itself, equivalence is
of dubious value. It has already been studied for
30 years, and the field could spend another 30
years in research primarily characterized by its
precise irrelevancy. Behavior analysis does not
have that time to waste.
As a result of this narrowing and the limits
of the phenomenon itself, the study of stimulus
equivalence seems to be adding little that cogni-
tive psychology had not already considered. The
rich literatures on semantic network theory and
transitive inference, for example, provide con-
ceptual and empirical analyses that can incorpo-
rate the phenomenon of equivalence class for-
mation and a great deal more as well.
We are not calling for behavior analysts to
embrace cognitive psychology. To the contrary,
it is precisely because it is the mission of behav-
ior analysis to provide its own account of hu-
man complexity that this solution is unacceptable.
But the field cannot wait forever for real progress.
If stimulus equivalence is not the vehicle for fun-
damental progress - and it seems undeniably clear
that it is not - we must move on to approaches
that are more productive.
Symmetry and Backward Associative
Conditioning
Our foregoing concerns clearly echo some of
Tonneau’s criticisms of  the stimulus equivalence
research program. However, we do not share all
of  his views. The concept of  stimulus equiva-
lence has oriented the field toward an important
property of human language and cognition, that
of the bi-directionality of stimulus relations
(“symmetry”). Curiously, this is precisely the area
that Tonneau brushes over in his analysis of  func-
tional equivalence.
The four types of  function transfer that Ton-
neau describes in his article could be based on
varieties of forward associative conditioning (sen-
sory preconditioning, second-order conditioning,
etc.), and he argues quite reasonably that transi-
tivity in matching to sample could also be con-
sidered in the same light. Then on page 19, in
parentheses, he suggests that symmetry might also
yield to a similar analysis, but he refuses to “press
such arguments any further.” It is this property
of bi-directionality (particularly when it is com-
bined with transitivity), that most requires an ac-
count, because it seems to require backward asso-
ciative conditioning.  Backward conditioning is a
notoriously weak effect that occurs in a rather
restricted set of conditions (see Spetch, Wilkie,
& Pinel, 1981). Hall (1996), a leader in the field
of associative learning, has stated that backward
associations in matching to sample contexts “are
not readily formed” (p. 248).
Interestingly, Hall (1996) has also argued that
when backward conditioning effects apparently
occur, using matching to sample, they may actu-
ally reflect a mediated form of  forward condi-
tioning. Imagine, for example, that a discrimina-
tive function transfers from C to B after A-B
and A-C pairings. Apparently, a result such as this
would require backward associative condition-
ing (i.e., A may acquire some of the functions of
B via forward conditioning, but C can only ac-
quire the functions of  A, and thus B, via back-
ward conditioning). Several researchers (Hall,
1996; L. J. Hayes, 1992; Urcuioli, 1996) have ar-
gued, however, that C-B transfer, in this case, may
be based on a mediated form of  forward con-
ditioning (i.e., mediated generalization) in the ab-
sence of  any backward associative processes.
According to this account, A-B pairing estab-
lishes a private perceptual function (or represen-
tation) of B whenever A is presented (i.e., when
the subject sees A, an image or representation of
B immediately occurs). Thus, whenever A and C
are paired, the private image of B is also paired
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with C (i.e., when the subject sees A, s/he imme-
diately thinks of B but then C is presented, and
thus the private image of B occurs before C). In
this case, the discriminative functions of C may
transfer to B via forward respondent condition-
ing.
Urcuioli (1996) also argued that in order for
this type of mediated generalization to occur, the
A-B training must occur before the A-C training.
If, however, A-B and A-C training occur con-
currently, “it is unlikely that [the A] samples could
generate the necessary prospective mediators to
support transfer” (Urcuioli, 1996, p. 65) to the B
stimuli. (Hall also implies this argument in his
analysis, but he does not state it explicitly). In many
equivalence studies, however, A-B and A-C train-
ing trials are presented concurrently (e.g., Barnes-
Holmes, Keane, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2000;
Barnes & Keenan, 1993), and thus by this account
C-B transfer should not have occurred unless one
wishes to invoke the problematic concept of
backward associative conditioning.
Given these difficulties, it is perhaps not hard
to understand why Tonneau refused to address
the issue of symmetry in his article. If we are to
take his arguments seriously, however, he will have
to provide an account of those instances of func-
tion transfer that appear to require backward as-
sociative conditioning. Without this, his work sim-
ply questions the set-theoretic analysis of stimu-
lus equivalence, but offers nothing else in its place.
As it is, Tonneau has pointed to stimulus associa-
tions or correlations, rather than equivalence class
formation, as the basis for function transfer, but
he has completely failed to address the very issue
that made the concept of stimulus equivalence
necessary in the first place — the emergence of
bidirectional stimulus relations.
Relational Frame Theory: Moving Beyond
Function Transfer
One “solution” to the problem of
bidirectionality is simply to accept that backward
associative conditioning occurs readily and in most
conditions with humans, but with great difficulty
in nonhumans.  This is not unlike Sidman’s argu-
ment that equivalence is a basic stimulus function
(Sidman, 1994). It “solves” the problem of stimu-
lus equivalence, but as we will discuss below it
leaves untouched the substantial evidence that
bidirectionality characterizes many different types
of  stimulus relations (e.g., Dymond & Barnes,
1995, 1996; Roche & Barnes, 1996, 1997; Roche,
Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Barnes-Holmes, &
McGeedy, 2000; Steele & Hayes, 1991). Some-
thing much more flexible than backward condi-
tioning seems needed.
A ready behavioral alternative is available: the
bidirectional stimulus relations observed in
equivalence, and other types of stimulus relations,
reflects a generalized operant behavioral process
(Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2000; Hayes,
Gifford, & Wilson, 1996). This is the core con-
ception of Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes,
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). Associative or
stimulus-correlational effects are certainly also
involved (Barnes, 1994; Leader, Barnes, & Smeets,
1996), but they do not play a primary explana-
tory role in RFT (Barnes & Roche, 1996). In fact,
from the RFT perspective, the effects of stimu-
lus correlations on behavior may often depend
upon the generalized operant process of rela-
tional framing itself (see Barnes, Smeets, &
Leader, 1996, pp. 167-168; Leader, Barnes, &
Smeets, 1996, pp. 702-704; Leader, Barnes-
Holmes, & Smeets, 2000; Leader & Barnes-
Holmes, 2001, in press; Smeets, Leader, & Barnes,
1997).
Many RFT studies focus on non-equivalence
relations, and it is here that a simple explanation
in terms of  stimulus correlations (involving ei-
ther forward or backward associations) seems
almost completely untenable. Consider, for ex-
ample, a finding reported by Dymond and Barnes
(1995). In this study, what we call a relational net-
work was established using matching to sample
procedures. The derived stimulus relations most
relevant in the current context were as follows:
C1 same as B1; B2 less than B1; C2 more than
B1 (note the stimuli were nonsense syllables and
thus were not related to each other along any
consistent physical dimensions). A “one-re-
sponse” discriminative function was then estab-
lished for B1 using direct reinforcement. Subse-
quently, a “one-response” function emerged for
C1, a “zero-response” function emerged for B2,
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and a “two-response” function emerged for C2,
without explicit training.
In effect, the directly reinforced “one-re-
sponse” function established for B1 was trans-
formed in accordance with the derived same, less-
than, and more-than relations. B1 controlled one-
response by direct training, and thus C1, which
participated in a derived same relation with B1,
also controlled one-response. B2, however, par-
ticipated in a derived less than relation with B1,
while C2 participated in a derived more than rela-
tion with B1. Thus, B2 controlled a zero-response,
and C2 controlled two-responses.
We do not see how Tonneau’s account can
explain such data. During the training and testing
that produced these performances each of  the
stimuli were correlated with each other (indirectly
during training and directly during testing). If both
B2 and C2 were correlated with B1, why would
they acquire two different discriminative func-
tions, each of which differ from the trained B1
function? Although difficult to explain using the
concept of stimulus-correlations, data such as
these are readily explained by RFT in terms of
generalized operant response classes.
Other research findings that appear to stretch
a stimulus correlational account are also handled
with relative ease by RFT. Consider, for example,
a study reported by Barnes, Hegarty, and Smeets
(1997) in which matching to sample procedures
were used to establish four, three-member
equivalence classes (A1 B1 C1, A2 B2 C2, A3 B3
C3, A4 B4 C4). During one of the probe trials,
the B1 and C1 stimuli were presented together
as a compound sample stimulus, and two other
compound stimuli were presented as compari-
sons; B2C2 and B3C4. Subjects reliably chose the
B2C2 comparison over the B3C4 comparison,
and the authors described this outcome as relat-
ing one equivalence relation to a second equiva-
lence relation. This performance is readily pre-
dicted by RFT (see Stewart, Barnes-Holmes,
Hayes, & Lipkens, 2001, for an extended discus-
sion of relations among relations), but it is not
obvious how the concept of stimulus correla-
tions, per se, can accommodate these data. The
individual stimuli in the B2C2 and B3C4 com-
pounds were each equally correlated, during train-
ing and testing, with the two stimuli in the B1C1
compound (they were all incorrect stimuli in com-
parison sets), and thus there appears to be no
basis on which to predict the choice of B2C2.
In another part of the Barnes et al. study (data
not reported in the published version) the fol-
lowing trial-type was presented; B1C1 as sample
with B2C2 and A1C4 as comparisons. In this case,
the A1C4 choice contained a stimulus (A1) that
had been directly correlated, during training, with
both of the elements contained in the sample,
whereas B2C2 contained two stimuli that were
never correlated with either element. The sub-
jects chose B2C2, as RFT would predict, because
an equivalence relation is in a “frame of coordi-
nation” with an equivalence relation.
In case after case (we have presented only
two, but the possible examples are many), a pri-
mary focus on stimulus correlations, per se, ap-
pears to run into trouble when we consider some
of the data that has been gathered over the years
under the rubric of  RFT. We have made a simi-
lar argument against purely class-based accounts
of equivalence (Barnes & Roche, 1996; Hayes &
Barnes, 1997). It might be possible to save these
more limited accounts by attempting to confine
them only to certain kinds of studies of derived
stimulus relations and not others, but this saves
the accounts by killing them. It is not a theory of
a narrow research preparation that we need. If
RFT can explain equivalence and a host of other
phenomena, while other accounts cannot even
explain equivalence data such as those reported
by Barnes, et al. (1997), parsimony alone suggests
that RFT deserves the more serious consideration.
Conclusion
Equivalence research was rooted in the po-
tential it provided for the analysis of language.
The stultification of equivalence research comes
from forgetting that mission. Tonneau appears
to agree. However, like others before him
(whether pro- or anti-equivalence), Tonneau fails
to address the fundamental issues that seem to
underlie language and cognition, providing in-
stead an account that does not lead directly to




We believe that it is time for behavioral theo-
rists to face directly the challenge posed by other
forms of  derived stimulus relations, the trans-
formation of  functions through those relations,
relational networks, relations among relations, and
similar areas that RFT appears to handle with
relative ease. We have shown that these phenom-
ena lead directly to new empirical approaches to
the analysis of such topics as metaphor, allego-
ries, thinking, problem-solving, self, and similar
topics (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).
Furthermore, we have described how they lead
directly to new approaches to psychological de-
velopment, education, social behavior, psycho-
pathology, psychotherapy, and even spirituality
(Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). Rela-
tional Frame Theory provides a relatively simple,
operant account of the phenomenon of stimu-
lus equivalence, but in addition it accounts for
more complex phenomena as well, and in so
doing gives behavior analysis a powerful new
angle on human language and cognition itself.
To state it in simple terms, RFT claims that
relating is an operant. This is an empirical matter,
and must be so (see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, in press a, in press b;
Healy, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2000). Behav-
ior analysis is not a field worth having if it cannot
determine, on empirical grounds, what is or is
not an operant. Thus, the question “is relating an
operant?” must be answerable in one of three
ways: “no,” “not enough data yet,” or “yes.”  If
the answer is “no” then one must say why, in
clear conceptual or evidentiary terms. If  the an-
swer is “don’t know yet” one must say what other
evidence is needed. If  the answer is “yes,” then
behavior analysis will be forever changed. If re-
lating is an operant, it operates on operant and
respondent processes themselves (Hayes, Fox,
Gifford, Wilson, Barnes-Holmes, Healy, 2001; see
also Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2000;
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan,
2000).
Evidence is mounting in favor of the RFT
interpretation of equivalence responding, and
relational responding more generally (see Hayes,
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001, for a compre-
hensive review). The issue may not be closed as
an empirical matter, but we believe that it is now
clearly on the table. Of course, some may prefer
to ignore these fundamental issues and hope in-
stead that the corpse of stimulus equivalence will
be reincarnated in a different guise (e.g., as the
study of naming, stimulus control topographies,
or stimulus correlations). We believe, however,
that it is time to leave the graveside of stimulus
equivalence, turn to the mission that this research
area first provided, and attempt once more to
scale the mountains of human language and cog-
nition.
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Emergent matching to sample and equivalence relations
Harrie Boelens
Leiden University
Tonneau has presented a well-written,
thoughtful, and erudite critique of the literature
on stimulus equivalence. I will here react to two
of the issues he has raised: the importance of
studying emergent matching to sample, and the
proper application of the mathematical “equiva-
lence relation” concept.
The performances seen on tests of  stimulus
equivalence are no obvious conditioning effects.
I propose that that is justification enough for
studying them. Emergent matching to sample is
a puzzle for conditioning theory. We can hope
that working on this puzzle will lead to a revision
of  the theory, and that the revised theory will
make sense of other emergent phenomena, such
as those of generalized imitation, instruction fol-
lowing, and grammatical speech. For me, it is not
necessary that the puzzle has a feature (such as
“symbolic behavior”) that makes it look relevant
for something in everyday life. I agree with Ton-
neau that the cognitive journals present many facts
that do not have obvious behavior-analytic inter-
pretations, but does it matter? Studying them will
be worthwhile too! I find it a pity only that there
is not much diversity in this work. Working on
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many different puzzles at the same time might
be more fruitful than the massive concentration
on emergent matching to sample that we see
nowadays.
The applications of the mathematical “equiva-
lence relation” concept to emergent matching to
sample often show misunderstandings. Tonneau
will agree with me. I will here develop his point
further, in the hope of  producing more clarity.
Following Tonneau, define xRy to mean that com-
parison y is reliably selected in the presence of
sample x. We could suggest that R is an equiva-
lence relation (i.e., a relation that is reflexive, sym-
metric, and transitive). This suggestion has many
consequences. I will here consider five that are
not often appreciated. First, it does not make
sense to call the individual relations that are trained
or tested equivalence relations. Suppose we have
taught a subject conditional relations A1B1, A2B2,
B1C1, and B2C2. We can then ask if  the condi-
tional relation is an equivalence relation (for this
subject, at this time). It does not make sense to
ask if  A1B1, A2B2, etc. are equivalence relations.
Second, the relation R applies to matching to
sample, not to conditional discrimination in gen-
eral. Suppose A1 is a red light, A2 a green light,
B1 a low tone, and B2 a high tone. A rat’s lever
